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Abstract 
Delay is acknowledged as one of the most common, costly, and risky problems, and the source of frequent disputes and claims 
among owners, clients and consultants leading to lawsuits. Such situations usually involve questioning the facts, causal factors, 
contract interpretations and quantum of the claims. Questions that emerge are: Does a particular delay warrant an extension of 
project duration and/or an extra cost? What is the maximal amount that an activity can be held responsible for? How can costs be 
divided among the activities? Since the ability to make a claim is very much based on what the contract says about delays, 
contractual documentation needs to reflect the particular nature of each project in order to prevent disputes and claims. This 
paper proposes a method based on game theory and applies it to a road building project, in order to identify the activities that are 
responsible for the delay of the project and divide the costs among them. Using the model presented in this paper, a wide variety 
of project situations can be modelled and placed as contractual obligations. The number of variables, equations, and inequalities 
needed to model these real-life situations will depend on the complexity of the problem. 
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1. Introduction 
A vital section specified in any contract is the performance period of time of project execution. However, the real 
duration of the activities in a project is usually extended and the time required to complete it is frequently greater 
than the time specified in the contract. These overruns on time extension give rise to delays.  
Delays may be defined as an act or event that extends the time required to perform the tasks under a constraint 
[1]. They occur in every construction project and their magnitude varies considerably from project to project [2]. 
Strikes, rework, poor organization, material shortage, equipment failure, change orders, act of God, are the main 
factors causing delays.  
Delays are disruptive and expensive. There is a universal agreement that delay is acknowledged as the most 
common, costly, complex and risky problem, representing an area of leakage in the construction industry worldwide 
[3,4]. Peurifoy and Ledbetter [5] identify that the construction industry is one that deals with the conversion of plans 
and specifications into a finished product. It comprises a mixed variety of organizations that face different situation 
and to some degree similar pressures. Many of these problematic situations (cash-flow problems, equipment failures, 
material shortage, etc.) are beyond control and often lead to delay. In addition, delays are interconnected making the 
situation even more complex and the problem can be more evident in traditional types of contract which is awarded 
to the lowest bidder [6].  
Because of the overriding importance of time for both the owner (in terms of performance) and the contractor (in 
terms of money), delays are the source of frequent disputes and claims among owners, clients and consultants 
leading to lawsuits [2]. Such situations usually involve questioning the facts, causal factors, contract interpretations, 
quantum of the claims, mistrust, arbitration, cash-flow problems, loss of productivity and even total abandonment or 
termination of contract [7].  
When a project is delayed questions that emerge are: Does a particular delay warrant an extension of project 
duration and/or an extra cost? If an activity, whose real duration is greater than the planned duration, makes use of 
the expedition created by other activities, is this activity responsible for the delay? What is the maximal amount that 
an activity can be held responsible for? How can costs be divided among the activities? Despite the high number of 
papers published, most of these papers only focus on identifying factors, causes and effects of delays based on 
surveys of owners, contractors, or clients. Several papers analyze factors of delays focusing on the factors of delays 
in projects in different countries [8-13], factors that contribute to the likelihood of project delay using statistical 
methods [14], factors influencing contractor performance [15], factors affecting the analysis of inclement weather 
delays [16], and factors that lead to project delays and tools used to mitigate their effects [17]. Other papers deal 
with causes of delays focusing on the causes of these delays in projects in different countries [2,4,18-27], causes of 
delays and their importance according to project participants [28], causes of delays from the viewpoint of owners, 
contractors and architectural/engineering firms [29], causes of delays by looking at the responsibility of major 
parties [30], contributions of clients, contractors and others to time overrun [31], causes of delays with traditional 
type contracts [6], causes of delays to establish adequate evaluation prior to the contract award [32], causes of non-
excusable delays identifying the factors contributing to those causes [33], perceptions of civil construction 
practitioners on how significant causes of delays are [34]. Several papers deal with other aspects of project delays as 
dispute resolution [35], tools to aid in analysis of delay claims [36], computational methods [37], delay analysis 
methodologies and their advantages or disadvantages [38,39], effects of project size, construction type, number of 
bidders on project delays [40] and effects on time and cost [7,41].  
This paper develops a model based on game theory in order to identify the activities that are responsible for the 
delay in a project and divide the cost among them. The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an 
introduction to negotiation theory and game theory together with a model based on the concept of the core of a 
game. Next, the proposed model is applied to a road building project to show its applicability to a particular project 
situation. Finally, there is a concluding section with the main results of the paper. 
2. Game theory and Negotiation 
Negotiation is an important aspect of a project. Negotiation plays an important role in resolving claims, 
preventing disputes, and keeping a harmonious relationship between project participants [42]. However, most 
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project managers consider negotiation as the most time-and energy-consuming activity in claim management [43]. 
In addition, claim negotiation is commonly inefficient due to the diversity of intellectual background, many 
variables involved, complex interactions, and inadequate negotiation knowledge of project participants [42,44]. 
To address the complex technical and human issues in negotiation, different negotiation theories and models are 
available which mainly include game theory, economic theory, and behavior theory [42]. Game theory is divided 
into two approaches, the axiomatic approach and the strategic approach. Under the latter approach game theorists 
treat economic theory as a part of game theory. On the other hand, negotiation theorists usually distinguish game 
theory (mainly referring to the axiomatic approach) from economic theory [45]. Game theory seeks to get at the 
essential of decision making and the associated strategies in situations where two or more parties are interdependent, 
and where the outcome of their conflict and competition must be the product of their joint requirements and the 
interaction of their separate choices [46]. All the players in games are assumed to be rational, try to maximize their 
own utilities, and have complete information on the payoff function and utility function [47]. In contrast to the 
classical game theory approach, in economic theory there is no concern for the discovery of once-and-for-all 
strategies, but rather an intention to examine how the bargainers should interact in terms of their expectations of 
each other [48]. Economic models analyze the processes through which the demands of the participants converge in 
the course of offers and counteroffers toward some specific point on the contract curve [46]. In behavior theory 
much attention is given to the nature of changing expectations and negotiators’ tactics, and to the significance of 
uncertainties of information, perception and evaluation, all matters that tend to be ignored by game theory and 
economic theory [49]. Behavior theory attempts to analyze the negotiation processes in which negotiators influence 
each other’s expectations, perceptions, assessments, and decisions during the search of an outcome.  
This paper deals with the topic from a different perspective and adopts the negotiation theorists’ approach. The 
paper uses a model based on Game theory, defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation 
between intelligent rational decision-makers [50], in order to identify the activities that are responsible for the delays 
in a project and divide the costs among them.  
In project management game theory is still in the beginning of its practical applications. Branzei et al. [51] 
proposed two coalitional games related to delays cost sharing problems to determine fair shares for each of the 
agents who contribute to the delay of a project such that the total delay cost is cleared. Bergantinos and Sanchez [52] 
introduced a non-transferable utility game associated to the Program and Evaluation review Technique (PERT) 
problem to divide the floats of time among the different activities. In a second paper, Bergantinos and Sanchez [53] 
presented two different approaches, one based on serial cost sharing problems and the other in game theory, to 
distribute the cost caused by the delay of a project among the firms which are responsible for it. Estevez-Fernandez 
et al. [54] analyzed both delayed and expedited problems where the penalty (reward) function is proportional with 
respect to the total delay (expedition) of the project. In a second paper, Estevez-Fernandez [55] analyzed project 
problems with arbitrary but non-decreasing penalty and rewards functions taking into account whether an activity 
could be started before its planned starting time. San Cristobal [56] applied the Shapley value to the fair allocation 
of gains obtained by cooperation among several firms carrying out a vessel drydocking who form a coalition to 
expedite the project.  
In a broad sense, game theory can be classified into two categories: non-cooperative game approaches, where a 
decision making unit treats the others as competitors, and cooperative approaches where a group of decision makers 
decide to undertake a project together in order to achieve their joint business objectives. In game theory individuals 
or groups become players when their respective decisions, coupled with the decisions made by other players, 
produce an outcome. The options available to players to bring about particular outcomes are called strategies. 
Strategies are linked to outcomes by a mathematical function that specifies the consequences of the various 
combinations of strategy choices by all of the players in a game. A coalition refers to the formation of sub-sets of 
players' options under coordinated strategies.  
In Game theory the core is the set of feasible allocations that can not be improved upon by a coalition. An 
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where V(S) is the characteristic function V of the subset S indicating the amount (reward) that the members of S can 
be sure of receiving if they act together and form a coalition (or the amount that members of S can get without any 
help from players who are not in S).  
Eq. (1) states that an imputation x is in the core (that x is undominated) if and only if for every coalition S, the 
total of the received by the players in S (according to x) is at least as large as V(S). The core can also be defined by 
Eq. (2) as the set of stable imputations: 
      ¿¾






in , and :,,: 1   (2) 




ixSV , we say that the imputation x is unstable through a coalition S, and we say x is stable otherwise.  
The core can consist of many points. Even, the size of the core can be taken as a measure of stability or how 
likely it is that a negotiated agreement is prone to be upset. In order to determine the maximum penalty (cost) that a 
coalition in the network can be sure of receiving, the linear programming problem represented by Eq (3) is used 
[57]: 
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3. Application 
The purpose of this section is to determine the maximum delay that an activity of a project can be held 
responsible for, and next, to share the penalty associated with the total delay of the project among the activities that 
have caused this delay. To explain the proposed approach, the road building project shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1 is 
presented. Let us consider that, when drafting the contract, the following terms are included: “A coalition is defined 
as the activity or set of activities of the network that represent a sub-path within a path. Each coalition is considered 
a player. The activities that form a coalition and are in the same path can take advantage of the expedition of the 
activities or coalitions within the same path. Any coalition can not be held responsible for more than the total delay 
of the project but will be held responsible for, at least, ten percent of the delay caused by these coalitions 
individually. Each day that the project is delayed a penalty of 500 dollars will be applied to a coalition”.  
As we can see, in the network there are three paths and four coalitions (AB; CDE; GH; and F). In order to 
calculate the delay and expedition of the activities, and real duration of the project the following equations are used 
(Estevez-Fernandez 2012):       ]0,max[ ipirid   (4) 
      ]0,max[ iripie   (5) 
where p(i) and r(i) represent the planned and real time, and d(i) and e(i) represent the delay and expedition functions 
of activity i respectively. The planned, real duration and float of the paths are calculated as follows:    ¦  DD Ni ippND ,  (6) 
   ¦  DD Ni iirrND ,  (7) 
     pNDlDpNFloat ,, DD   (8) 
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where  pND ,D   and  rND ,D   are the planned and real duration of a path DN , D(l) is the planned duration of 
the project (i.e., the maximum of  pND ,D ), and  pNFloat ,D  is the maximum time that the path DN  can be 
delayed without altering the duration of the project. If a path has float zero, then we say that this path is critical. 
 
Table 1. Tasks associated to the project 
Task Node Description Predecessor 
A 1-2 Demolitions - 
B 2-3 Walls A 
C 3-6 Transport of earths B 
D 1-4 Longitudinal and transversal drainage - 
E 4-5 Telecommunication infrastructures D 
F 5-7 Granular and asphalt capes E 
G 7-8 System of road signs F 

















Fig.1. Network associated to the project 
 
Table 2 shows the planned and real time (in days), and delay and expedition of the activities after the realization 
of the project, calculated using Eqs. (4) and (5), and the planned, real duration, and float of the paths calculated 
using Eqs. (6), (7) and (8) are shown in Table 4. The planned duration of the project, D(l), is 165 days, the 
maximum duration of  pND ,D  that corresponds to path N1, but the real duration, D(r), is 190 days, the maximum 
duration of  rND ,D  that also corresponds to path N1. Thus the total delay of the project is D(r)-D(l) = 25 days. 
By adding the delays of activities A, B, and C we obtain that the delay of the coalition (AB) is 40 days. However, 
these coalitions can not be held responsible for more than 25 days, the total delay of the project, because other 
activities of the project have been expedited. Thus, coalition (H) is responsible for 5 days on its own but when 
forming a coalition with (FG), they are only responsible for 2 days because they take advantage of the expedition of 
activities F and G (7 days). Table 5 shows the delay for the rest of the coalitions in the network calculated in a 
similar way, and the cost, Cy(S), associated to each coalition considering that the penalty for each day the project is 
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Table 2. Planned time, real time, delays and expeditions 
Task p(i) r(i) d(i) e(i) 
A 20 35 15 0 
B 40 60 20 0 
C 60 65 5 0 
D 30 25 0 5 
E 40 30 0 10 
F 20 18 0 2 
G 75 70 0 5 
H 25 30 5 0 
 
 
Table 3. Planned, real duration, and slack of the paths 
Path Coalitions  pND ,D  Slack  pN ,D   rND ,D  
N1 ABC-H 145 165-145 = 200 190 
N2 DE-H 95 165-95 = 70 85 
N3 DE-FG 165 165-165 = 0 143 
 
Table 5. Coalitions, delays (days) and costs associated to each coalition 
Coalition Delay Cost Coalition Delay Cost Coalition Delay Cost 
ABC 40 20,000 ABC,DE 40 20,000 ABC,DE,FG 18 9,000 
DE 0 0 ABC,FG 40 20,000 ABC,DE,H 30 15,000 
FG 0 0 ABC,H 45 22,500 ABC,FG,H 45 22,500 
H 5 2,500 DE,FG 0 0 DE,FG,H 0 0 
   DE,H 0 0 N 25 12,500 
   FG,H 2 1,000    
 
Once we have the coalitions that can be created in the project and the total delay that these coalitions can be held 
responsible for, the next step is to allocate the total penalty among the delayed coalitions and activities. Using model 
(3) and the assumptions considered at the beginning of this section, we have: 
 
Maximize  HFGDEABC XXXX   (9) 
subject to 000,20000,2 dd ABCX  (10) 
 500,2500 dd HX  (11) 
 000,20d DEABC XX  (12) 
 000,20d FGABC XX  (13) 
 000,1d HFG XX  (14) 
 000,20d FGDEABC XXX  (15) 
 000,15d HDEABC XXX  (16) 
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 500,22d HFGABC XXX  (17) 
 500,12  HFGDEABC XXXX  (18) 
 0,  FGDE XX  (19) 
 0,,, tGHFCDEAB XXXX  (20) 
 
where inequalities (10) and (11) are based on the assumption that any coalition that form a sub-path and cause a 
delay in the project, will be held responsible for at least, ten percent of the delay caused by these coalitions 
individually. Thus, coalition (ABC) will be held responsible for, at least, 2,000 dollars and no more than 20,000 
dollars (45 days) and coalition (H) will be held responsible for, at least 500 dollars and no more than 2,500 dollars 
(5 days). Inequalities (12) and (13) establish that coalition (ABC,DE) and (ABC,FG) can not be held responsible for 
more than 20,000 dollars (40 days).  Inequality (14) establishes that coalition (FG,H) can not be held responsible for 
more than 2,500 dollars (5 days). Inequalities (15)-(17) are calculated in a similar way. Inequality (19) establishes 
that coalitions (CDE) and (GH) can not be punished because these coalitions have been expedited and inequality 
(20) establishes that, since the total delay of the project is 25 days, the maximum penalty to allocate among the 
coalitions is 12,500 dollars. Finally, inequality (21) establishes the non-negativity constraint.  
The solution to the above linear programming problem is XABC = 12,000, XDE = 0, XFG = 0, and XH = 500. This 
solution implies that, since any coalition can not be held responsible for more that the total delay of the project, the 
maximum penalty that coalitions ABC and H are responsible for is 12,500 dollars. Thus, coalition (ABC) that has 
been delayed for 40 days, taking advantage of the expedition of coalition (DE) and (FG), is only responsible for 
12,000 dollars, and coalition H, that has been delayed for 5 days, taking advantage of the expedition of coalition 
(CDE), is only responsible for 500 dollars. Coalitions (DE) and (FG) are not responsible for any delay. 
The last step is to share the cost allocated to a coalition (player) among the activities that form this coalition. This 
is the case of activities A and B, responsible for a cost of 11,000 dollars.  This amount will be shared proportionally 
according to the delay of these activities (15 and 20 days respectively) to the total delay of the coalition (35 days). 
Thus, the cost allocated to activity A is 5,143 dollars and to activity B is 6,857 dollars. 
4. Conclusions and future research 
The construction sector represents one of the most dynamic and complex industrial environments where conflicts 
among builders and owners are very common particularly in a bidding or claiming situation where owners, builders 
and contractors pursue their own interests at the expense of the others, leading to conflict or cooperation. The time 
required to complete the project is usually greater than the time specified in the contract and, because of the 
overriding importance of time for both the owner and the contractor, delays are the source of frequent disputes and 
claims among owners, clients and consultants, leading to lawsuits. There is a general consent between theorists that 
Game theory provides, by its very nature, the appropriate tools for the analysis and eventual solution of conflicts of 
any kind. The course of a conflict as well as its resolution depends on the decisions made by the various actors 
involved. Each party, when considering is decisions, should take into account the decisions made by all the other 
parties. Game theory is a natural tool that can be used in such interactive situations where the results of the 
interaction depend on all the players’ decisions. 
Despite the extensive literature devoted to the delays in the project management industry, most of this literature is 
focused on identifying factors, causes, and effects. When computing delays, it is necessary a method that can be 
established in the contract and used systematically in claiming situations in order to avoid conflicts, and even 
promote cooperation between players. Using the model presented in this paper, a wide variety of project situations 
can be modeled and placed as contractual obligations when drafting the contract.  
For example, the contract could contain terms which ensure the maximum or minimum penalty that an activity 
and/or coalition can be held responsible for. This can be performed considering different values in the first and last 
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terms of the constraints. For example, inequality (11) establishes that coalition (H) will be held responsible for, at 
least 500 dollars (minimum) and no more than 2,500 dollars (maximum). If these values are replaced, the activity 
and/or coalition will be held responsible for an amount between the new maximum and minimum values. 
To limit the period of delays can also be considered in the model by giving different values to the term V(N) in 
the model. In the application presented in this paper, the maximum amount that a coalition can be held responsible 
for is the maximum delay of the project, 25 days ($12,500). By replacing this value, the period of delays can be 
limited to the specified value. 
Who takes advantage of the delays is also possible to be represented in the model. This can be easily introduced, 
for example, setting the value of an imputation, x, equal to zero. This states that an activity, that forms a coalition 
with other activities, will not be held responsible for any delays caused by the coalition. The model is also able to 
represent situations where an activity and/or a coalition can be more penalized than others or situations where 
players (i.e., contractors or subcontractors) are encouraged to form coalitions. These situations can be considered 
through the introduction of coefficients in the model equations, both in the objective function or in the constraints. 
In the objective function, if the coefficient of a variable (activity and/or coalition) is greater (less) than unity the 
corresponding activity and/or coalition will be less (more) penalized than the rest of activities. Similarly, contractors 
and subcontractors can be encouraged to form coalitions using these coefficients in the constraints of the model. The 
greater (less) the coefficient, the more (less) encouraged the contractors are, since they will be less (more) penalized 
than the rest of contractors. Many other types of situations can be modelled using the model presented in this paper. 
The number of variables, equations, and inequalities needed to model these real-life situations will depend on the 
complexity of the problem. 
In order to increase the attractiveness of game theory for decision support in construction project management the 
limitations of the model presented must also be mentioned. In game theory all players are assumed to be rational, try 
to maximize their own utilities, and have complete information on the payoff function and utility function. The 
assumption that players are perfectly rational may never match a real-life situation in a construction project. Recent 
developments in game theory pay more attention to the behavioural aspects of the players including bounded 
rationality, emotions, and intuitive decision-making. Behavioural theory focuses on the complex human factors of 
negotiation trying to analyse the negotiation processes in which negotiators influence each other’s expectations, 
perceptions, assessments, and decisions during the search for an outcome. Initially, game theory assumes that the 
players possess complete information about the strategies and payoff functions of the other players. Unfortunately, 
in practice this is not the case. To overcome this limitation, games with incomplete information, imperfect 
information or asymmetric are more and more studied. 
Classical game theory assumes that each player decides in advance, before the game actually starts, what move 
he/she will make to maximize his/her own gain in any possible situation. However, the superlative rationality 
paradigm may not be the best one. Players tend to classify units as good enough or not good enough in terms of their 
positive attributes (benefit) and their negative attributes (cost) with regard to the evaluation goal. Satisficing game 
theory is an approach that evaluates alternatives on a bipolar basis introducing supporting and rejecting options in 
terms of two measures, selectability and rejectability.  
The example used in this paper to demonstrate the validity of the model is rather simple. When dealing with real 
project networks which may contain hundreds of interrelated activities, two main approaches have been proposed in 
order to transform complex networks into simpler and more synthetic networks. The method of modular 
decomposition, based on the identification of modules that can be synthetized by equivalent macro-activities, and 
the method of network reduction based on three different types of reduction, series, parallel and node reduction. 
Aggregation of project networks using these types of methods, can help to transform complex networks into simpler 
and more synthetic networks.  
Game theory can be one of the tools for exploring the negotiation structure of collective decision-making 
processes in the construction management industry. All the mentioned aspects can be used in future research to 
increase the reliability of the model. 
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